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Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study sheds light on the difficulties people face in cooperating to resist coercion. We adapt a 
threshold public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist 
coercion despite individual incentives to free-ride. Behavior in this resistance game is similar to 
that observed in multi-period public goods games. Specifically, we observe “out-of-equilibrium” 
outcomes and a decrease in successful resistance in later periods of a session compared to earlier 
ones. Nevertheless, cooperation remains relatively high even in the later periods. Finally, we find 
that increasing the resistance threshold has a substantial negative effect on the probability of 
successful resistance. 
 
 
Keywords: Coercion, Equity, Social preferences 
 
JEL Classification numbers : C91, C92, D63, H21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Liberal-democratic states often pursue coercive policies. Congleton (2011), Skaperdas 
(2011), and Wallis (2011) describe ways other than actual physical force in which coercion may 
arise in such regimes through tax, expenditure, and regulatory policies. For example, the 
collective choice to supply any given quantity of a public good, which lies at the very heart of 
public policy, implicitly involves coercion when a uniform tax-price is used to finance the public 
good in the presence of heterogeneous tastes.1 Individuals with heterogenoues tastes for a public 
good will demand different quantities of the good at any given tax-price. Due to the nature of a 
pure public good, however, everyone must consume the same quantity. Therefore, government is 
implicitly coercing some people to consume more (less) than their optimal quantity of the public 
good at the given tax-price.2  
In authoritarian regimes, liberal-democratic regimes, and totalitarian regimes alike, 
people may seek to overturn government actions with which they disagree, i.e., coercive 
government actions. The manner in which citizens can legitimately express resistance to 
government action and the criteria for determining successful resistance depends on, among 
other things, the nature of the regime. Generally speaking, however, resisting government action 
is costly to individuals in terms of time, money, and possibly one’s very well-being. To succeed, 
typically resistance must exceed a threshold --- a tipping point. There may be formal and explicit 
                                                 
1 More specifically, Winer (2011) provides a cardinal measure of coercion in this context using 
Lindahl prices as a reference point and Martinez-Vazquez and Sehili (2011) provide an 
interesting application of this measure of coercion using a computable general equilibrium 
model. 
2 In economics, a pure pubic good is non-rival in consumption and non-exclusive. Therefore, 
everyone must consume the same quantity of it. An example of pure public goods is national 
defense. The assumption that everyone pays a uniform tax-price for the public good is made to 
simplify the discussion. This assumption could be relaxed to allow for a variety of tax prices. 
Technically speaking, Winer et al. (2011) contend that there is coercion if their marginal rate of 
substitution for the public good is different from the tax-price that they pay to the government to 
provide it. 
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rules describing the threshold for successful resistance (i.e., majority rule in liberal-democratic 
regimes) or arbitrary and implicit rules (i.e., intolerable level of social unrest), particularly in 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 
In any event, the threshold, whatever it may be, can be achieved either through large 
contributions of time, money, and effort by a few individuals or through small contributions of 
the same by many. Since a commitment device is typically not available, a substantial 
coordination problem arises when trying to rally public support to resist unpopular government 
actions. Cooperating to resist government action is similar to cooperating to provide a public 
good. With this highly stylized description of resisting coercive government action in mind, we 
adapt a public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist coercion. 
For this purpose, we use a resistance game, similar to the one used by Mertins (2008) to examine 
procedural justice.  
In our version of a resistance game, a randomly chosen, anonymous, decision-maker 
(DM) is given the opportunity to expropriate all or part of the experimental endowments of 4 
experimental subjects, henceforth referred to as “Others.” Others can resist a DM’s transfer 
demand by making voluntary contributions to a resistance fund. If the resistance fund balance 
(RFB) equals or exceeds a pre-determined, common knowledge threshold, the Others are not 
required to pay the DM’s transfer demand. If, however, the RFB does not equal or exceed the 
resistance threshold, then resistance is unsuccessful, and the Others are required to pay the DM’s 
transfer demand. Whether or not resistance is successful, the Others lose their contributions to 
the resistance fund. 
Presumably one’s contribution to the resistance fund is the result of the interplay between  
(1) the intensity of one’s desire to resist a given transfer demand, and (2) one’s subjective beliefs 
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regarding the amount that the remaining members of the group will contribute to the fund. As in 
the real world, allowing particpants to make differing contributions to the resistance fund reflects 
the fact that the cost of resistance is typically a continuous choice variable in terms of time, 
money, and perhaps physical risk and not a simple binary choice variable. 
Due to the non-exclusive nature of successful (or unsuccessful) resistance, cooperating to 
resist government action creates a social dilemma, as in the case of voluntary provision of a 
public good. In the context of our game, Others are collectively better off when ‘out of 
equilibrium’ transfer demands by DMs are successfully resisted.3 However, a subject in this 
game can gain a private advantage from not contributing to the resistance fund and free-riding on 
successful resistance financed by the remaining members of the group. The inability to exclude 
those who do not contribute to the resistance fund from enjoying the benefit of successful 
resistance creates the social dilemma and thus exacerbates the coordination problem in our 
resistance game. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the ability of subjects to cooperate to resist 
coercive expropriation of their experimental endowments by a randomly selected, anonymous 
DM. Specifically, we examine the interplay between increasing the resistance threshold on the 
size of a DM’s transfer demand and the ability of Others to cooperate in resisting expropriation 
of their experimental endowment. Summarizing our main results, DMs generally pursue “out-of-
equilibirum” strategies, and Others only enjoy partial success in resisting these transfer demands. 
Consequently, the observed average earnings of DMs is substantially greater than that predicted 
                                                 
3 An out-of-equilibrium transfer demand is one that exceeds the resistance threshold divided by 
the number of Others. More specifically, suppose the resistance threshold is 13 francs, and there 
are 4 Others. As discussed in greater detail below, the equilibrium transfer demand in this 
example is 3 francs. Others should not contribute to resist a transfer demand less than the 
equilibrium value of 3 francs because successful resistance would cost them more than simply 
paying the DM’s transfer demand.  
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by the theory. We find this, despite the fact that the forecasts of the RFB by Others is remarkably 
accurate. We also find evidence that the probability of resistance decreases in later rounds of a 
session as compared to the probability of resistance in the initial rounds. Finally, increasing the 
resistance threshold from 13 francs to 29 francs has a substantial positive effect on a DM’s 
average transfer demand; a substantial negative effect on the probability of resistance; and a 
positive (negative) effect on the earnings of DMs (Others).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
resistance game in greater detail. In the subsequent section, we provide a detailed discussion of 
our empirical findings. The final section concludes. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHOD 
This experiment consists of two resistance level treatments, and five total  sessions. Each 
session consists of  15 university students for a total of 75 subjects in the entire experiment4.. All 
trading is in francs, an experimental currency, which is converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of 1 
franc = $0.20 or 5 francs = $1.00 for purposes of paying the subjects. Subjects are undergraduate 
and graduate students with a variety of majors. All are inexperienced subjects, in that none 
participated in a previous experiment with similar design and each subject participated in only 
one session of our expriment. Participants earn from $12.40 to $130.80 in the experiment, with 
average earnings of $49.40.5 Each session took approximately two hours to complete. Based on 
our observations, the participants appeared to be motivated by the monetary rewards.  
                                                 
4 Two DMs and two Others do not report their marital status, so they are excluded from the regression analysis 
5 A participant’s total compensation includes a $2 bonus for being on time and $4 for completing 
a post-experiment questionnaire. All 75 participants received the additional compensation of $6. 
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Upon arrival at the designated time and place of the experiment, subjects receive a set of 
instructions which the experimenter read aloud.6 Subjects were encouraged to ask clarifying 
questions, and the experimenters conducted a few practice periods to make sure everyone 
understood the instructions. Each session consists of 10 (8) decision periods.7 The 15 participants 
in a given session are randomly and anonymously assigned to one of three groups of five 
subjects each. One member of each group is randomly designated the DM; the remaining 4 group 
members are henceforth referred to as Others. As explained in the instructions, the membership 
of each group of 5 and their respective roles in each group are pre-randomized by the 
experimenter. Participants of the 3 groups and their respective roles in each group remain the 
same throughout a session. Members of a group do not know the identity of the  members of 
their group, and they do not know one anothers’ roles, i.e., DM or Other.  
At the beginning of each decision period, all subjects are endowed with 25 francs ($5.00). 
As mentioned earlier, our experimental design is most similar to a more complex procedural 
justice design used by Mertins (2008). Little resistance occurred in that study. Although there are 
other design differences, we believe the the  primary reason there is more resistance in our 
experiment is the reference frame of the DM. The DM in Mertins’ study had no initial 
endowment and thus no earnings from the experiment unless he solicits and received funds from 
the Others. If the Others are averse to such inequities, then they may not resist transfer demands 
by DMs which make the distribution of payoffs among the subject more equal. To avoid this 
induced reference frame, we gave our DMs the same initial endowment as the Others.  
                                                 
6 The instructions are included in an appendix to this paper. 
7 Though our intention was to include 10 rounds in each session, the first session only included 8 
rounds because we ran short of time. 
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The DM of each group then announces a transfer demand to the Others in his group; the 
DM’s proposed transfer demand is the same for all 4 Others. For example, suppose the DM 
makes a transfer demand of 5 francs. Ignoring for the moment the ability of Others to resist such 
demands, 5 francs would be subtracted from the endowment of each of the 4 group members 
thus resulting in a total transfer demand of 20 francs. Upon receiving the DM’s transfer demand, 
the Others then decide whether and how much to contribute to the resistance fund. An Other can 
pay any number of francs into the group’s resistance fund. To resist paying a DM’s transfer 
demand, the RFB must equal or exceed a pre-determined threshold. During each period, the 
experimenter calculates the RFB for each of the 3 groups. If during a a given period in treatment 
1 of the experiment, a group’s RFB equals or exceeds 13 francs ($2.60), the group’s resistance is 
declared successful, and the Others in this group are not required to pay the DM’s transfer 
demand.  If, however, a group’s RFB is less than 13 francs, the Others lose their contributions to 
the fund and must also pay the DM’s transfer demand. In addition to three sessions of treatment 
1 described above, we also conduct two sessions of treatment 2, with a resistance threshold of 29 
francs ($5.80).  
Before learning the group’s RFB during a given period, all subjects (the DMs and Others) 
are asked to forecast the RFB for that period, and subjects receive $0.25 each period for 
recording a forecast. After forecasts are recorded, the total fund balance of each group is 
announced to the participants. However, they are not told the amount contributed by individual 
members of their group. After learning whether resistance was successful or not, the subjects 
calculate their period earnings. The subsequent periods repeat these steps, with all subjects 
beginning each period with a fresh endowment of 25 francs. After completing the 10 (8) decision 
periods, participants complete a post-experiment questionnaire that includes demographic 
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questions as well as questions regarding their reaction to the experiment. To motivate thoughtful 
responses, they receive $4 for completing the questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, 
the experimenters pay the subjects privately in cash. 
In a one-shot version of this game with a resistance threshold of 13 (29) francs, the 
efficient, subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are the following: 1.) the DM makes a transfer 
demand of 3 (7) francs, and 2.) the Others contribute nothing to the resistance fund. Using 
backward induction, the equilibrium strategies of a multi-period version of this game is the same 
as for the one-shot version. Since the two resistance thresholds – 13 and 29 francs -- are not 
evenly divisible by 4, the game does not have a unique equilibrium. For example, with a 
threshold of 13 frances, 3 subjects could contribute 3 francs and the remaining subject would 
have to contribute 4 francs to resist a DM’s transfer demand.  Thus, there are 4 equilibrium 
strategies: (T; C1, C2, C3, C4) = (3;4,3,3,3), (3;3,4,3,3), (3;3,3,4,3), and (3;3,3,3,4), where T is the 
DM’s transfer demand and Ci is Other i’s (=1,..,4) contribution to the resistance fund. This 
feature of the experiment makes coordination by the Others on the efficient, subgame perfect 
equilibrium strategy more difficult because one and only one member of the group should step 
forward and make the higher contribution to the resistance fund.  
Assuming that all subjects employ equilibrium strategies throughout the sessions, a DM’s 
total payoff in treatment 1 (2) would be 280 (320) francs or $56 ($74), and the total payoff to an 
Other in treatment 1 (2) would be 220 (180) francs or $44 ($26). We proceed below with a 
detailed discussion of our findings.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This section is organized as follows. We begin by briefly discussing the descriptive 
statistics of our sample. Next, we discuss the frequency distribution of transfer demands and the 
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frequency distribution of successful resistance, conditional on the transfer demand. Then, we 
discuss the results of our econometric models of the DM’s and Other’s decisions or strategy 
choices. Finally, we discuss the frequency distribution of correct forecasts of resistance. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample of 719 decisions by 75 subjects. 
The sample consists of 144 transfer demands by 15 DMs and 575 contribution decisions by 60 
Others. Of the 15 DMs, 9 participate in treatment 1, making 84 transfer demands, and 6 
participate in treatment 2, making 60 transfer demands. Meanwhile, 36 Others participate in 
treatment 1 and 24 in treatment 2, making 335 and 240 contribution decisions, respectively. The 
average transfer demand is 9.85 francs, and the average transfer demand is greater in treatment 2 
than in treatment 1. The average contribution to the resistance fund is 4.02 francs. Again, the 
average contribution is slightly greater in treatment 2 than in treatment 1. However, the average 
contribution in treatment 1, when multiplied by 4, exceeds the resistance threshold of treatment 
1. In contrast, the average contribution in treatment 2 when multiplied by 4, does not exceed the 
resistance threshold of treatment 2.  
Slightly less than 46 percent of all transfer demands are resisted. Substantially more 
transfer demands in treatment 1 are resisted than in treatment 2, specifically 56 percent versus 33 
percent, respectively. Interestingly, the average forecast error of the RFB during each period is 
surprisingly small, approximately 2 francs for Others and 0.29 francs for DMs. The average age 
of Others (DMs) is 24 (24) years old; 48 (79) percent are white; 50 (39) percent are Christian; 11 
(16) percent are married; and 54 (75) percent are female. 
Turning to average earnings, DMs earn on average 393.75 francs ($78.75), and Others 
earn on average 156.26 francs ($31.25). In treatment 1, the average earnings of DMs is 312.67 
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francs ($62.53) and 181.30 francs ($36.26) for Others. In treatment 2, average earnings are 
482.84 francs ($96.57) and 136.43 francs ($27.29) for DMs and Others, respectively.  
These patterns generally are as expected. Due to the power advantage of the DMs in this 
game, they make more on average than the Others, irrespective of the resistance threshold. As 
previously discussed, increasing the resistance threshold lowers the probability of resistance. 
Anticipating this apparently, DMs increase their average transfer demand. That combined with a 
lower probability of resistance results in DMs earning more on average in treatment 2 than in 
treatment 1; meanwhile, Others earn less in treatment 2 than in treatment 1. As a result, the 
average earnings differential between DMs and Others is 3.5 in treatment 2 as compared to 1.7 in 
treatment 1. In other words, increasing the resistance threshold by nearly 125 percent (from 13 to 
29 francs) results in a 100 percent increase in the earnings differential between DMs and Others. 
It is also interesting to compare the observed earnings, described above, with those 
predicted by the theory. As previously discussed, assuming subjects employ equilibrium 
strategies, a DM’s session earnings would be 280 (320) francs or $56 ($64) in treatment 1 (2), 
and the comparable figures for Others are 220 (180) francs $44 ($36) in treatment 1 (2). 
Comparing these figures with the observed session averages for our subjects, we find that the 
average session earnings of DMs is substantially greater than than that predicted by the theory, 
and the average session earnings of Others is substantially less than that predicted. However, the 
actual earnings differential between DMs and Others observed in our experiment for each 
treatment is greater than the predicted values for each treatment. According to the theory, 
increasing the resistance threshold should increase the earnings differential by 40 percent, but the 
observed increase is 100 percent. 
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Transfer demands and resistance 
 Figures 1 through 3 show the frequency distribution of transfer demands (in francs) and 
the frequency of resistance, conditional on the transfer demand, for all subjects, for treatment 1 
subjects, and for treatment 2 subjects, respectively. Figure 1 shows that the frequency 
distribution of DM’s transfer demands has modes at 10 francs, 15 francs, 20 francs, and 25 
francs, suggesting perhaps that numbers evenly divisible by 5 are focal points for purposes of 
choosing a transfer demand. Interestingly, the distribution of transfer demands appears to be 
approximately uniform between 1 and 8 francs in figure 1, and as we subsequently show in 
figures 2 and 3, as well. The median transfer demand for all DMs is 9 francs. 
 Comparing figures 2 and 3 allows us to examine the effect of increasing the threshold on 
the frequency distribution of transfer demands and the ability of Others to resist such demands. 
Generally speaking, the frequency distributions of transfer demands in figures 2 and 3 exhibit the 
same general features as those of figure 1. Specifically, the distributions are approximately 
uniform between 1 and 8 francs, and there are modes in both figures for transfer demands of 10, 
15, 20, and 25 francs, as before. The median transfer demand for treatment 1 is 8 francs ($1.80) 
and, for treatment 2, 10 francs ($2.00). This increase in the median transfer demand in treatment 
2 relative to treatment 1 implies that DMs are responding to the increase in the threshold by 
increasing their average transfer demand. This suggests that they have some insight into how the 
parameters of the game are influencing the strategic choices of Others. Furthermore, as the 
theory suggests, very few transfer demands in treatment 1 (2) less than 3 (7) francs are resisted, 
meaning that in such cases the RFB does not exceed the resistance threshold. In treatment 1, 
nearly all transfer demands greater than 10 francs are resisted. In treatment 2, however, Others 
are not as successful as the treatment 1 subjects in resisting transfer demands greater than 10. 
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This suggests that increasing the resistance threshold makes it more difficult for Others to 
coordinate to resist transfer demands. The increase in the difficulty of cooperating to resist 
transfer demands from increasing the resistance threshold also is reflected in the decrease in 
average period earning by Others in treatment 2 as compared to that of treatment 1. The average 
period earnings by Others in treatments 1 and 2 are 19.48 francs ($3.90) and  13.79 francs 
($2.76), respectively. 
While we can take reassurance from the fact that the theory explains some patterns in our 
data, it is also clear that DMs choose “out of equilibrium” strategies more often than not. This is 
consistent with previous findings in related literatures: “out of equliliburim”strategies are not 
unusual in experimental studies with repeated play. The DM may be learning about the 
probability of resistance by trying to separate individual preferences and group coordination 
issues. Furthermore, the ability to resist ‘outsized’ transfer demands – those greater than the 
resistance threshold divided by 4 – in our data is substantially greater than suggested by the 
theory which predicts that the Others will make no contribution to the resistance fund. In other 
words, in the theory, everyone will try to free-ride and resistance of out-sized transfer demands 
will always fail. 
Modeling the strategy choices of DMs and Others 
 In this section, we briefly discuss the results of econometric models describing the 
strategy choices of DMs and Others. The estimates of these two models are reported in tables 2 
and 3, respectively.  
Beginning with our model of the DMs strategy choice, we estimate a random effects 
model in which the dependent variable is the DMs’ tranfer demand (in francs). We include 
demographic characteristics of the DM (i.e., gender, martial status, age, age-squared, and a 
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dummy variable for white) in the model to control for unobserved differences in tastes that may 
influence their strategy choices. We are assuming that such tastes may be correlated with certain 
demographic characteristics of the subject. We estimate a random effects model to account for 
unobserved differences in tastes that are uncorrelated with observables, such as race, gender, age, 
religion, and so on. In order for our estimates to be consistent, the distribution of the 
unobservable, random taste variable must be normally distributed. We find that the estimated 
coefficients of age and race are negative and statistically significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels.8  
We also include characteristics of the game and treatments among the regressors to 
control for monetary incentives embedded in the game. Specifically, we include among the 
regressors lagged transfer demands to account for “learning-by-doing,” the DM’s forecast of the 
the RFB, the lagged forecast error, and resistance in the previous period. By including a dummy 
variable equal to 1.0 for treatment 2, we are able to examine the effect of changing the resistance 
threshold on the strategy choices of DMs which is a focus of this regression. Somewhat 
surprising, this indicator variable is negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero at 
conventional levels. Among the incentive variables, only the lagged transfer demand is 
statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. It is positive, suggesting that 
DMs increase their transfer demand in subsequent periods.  
Turning to our results for the strategy choices of those assigned to the role of Others, we 
also estimate a random effects model to account for unobserved tastes that may influence 
strategy choices. In two specifications of this model, we estimate Two-Stage Least Squares 
                                                 
8 We report clustered standard errors, clustering on the identity of the decision-maker (DMs and 
Others, as the case may be) to account for the fact that a set of observations apply to one 
individual and thus these observations may not be independently distributed. 
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(2SLS) to account for the potential endogeneity of the variable “correctly forecasting whether or 
not the RFB equals or exceeds the resistance threshold.” We use the lagged value of the forecast 
as an instrumental variable for this potentially endogeneous variable. For comparision purposes, 
we also report OLS estimates which are reported in column 1 of table 3. Finally, we estimate two 
specifications of the 2SLS model, one specification includes a set of race indicator variables (i.e., 
Black, Hispanic, and Asian), and the other specification does not include this set of indicator 
variables. These results are reported in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of table 3. 
Beginning with the OLS estimates, the only variable that is statistically distinguishable 
from zero at conventional levels is the tranfer demand. The estimated coefficient is equal to 
0.219 (S.E. = 0.0242), and the estimate is nearly ten times its standard error. This estimate 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between the transfer demand and the size of the 
Others contribution to the resistance fund. 
Now, we turn to the 2SLS estimates reported in column 3. In contrast to our OLS 
specification, this model includes an indicator variable for correctly forecasting resistance. Since 
this variable is potentially endogeneous, we estimate the model using 2SLS. The instrumental 
variable is the lagged forecast of the RFB. The estimated coefficient of this variable is positive 
and more than twice it standard error. This estimate suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between a correct forecast of resistance and the size of the contribution to the resistance fund. 
The estimated coefficient of the threshold indicator variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, meaning that the average contribution in treatment 2 is greater 
than in treatment 1 due to the increase in the resistance threshold. Finally, the estimated 
coefficient of marital status (=1 if single) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
single subjects contribute more on average to the resistance fund than their married counterparts. 
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Distribution of RFB forecast accuracy 
 Now, we examine the forecasts of the RFB by the subjects in this experiment. Figures 4 
through 6 show the distributions of forecast accuracy for all subjects, treatment 1 subjects, and 
treatment 2 subjects, respectively. The horizontal axis of these figures categorizes subjects 
according to the proportion of times a given subject correctly forecasts whether or not the RFB 
would or would not equal or exceed the threshold.  
As previously noted, the forecast error of the RFB is remarkably small. This is borne out 
in table 4 which shows that approximately 55 subjects out of 75 are correct more than 40 percent 
of the time. Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of forecast accuracy of subjects in treatments 1 
and 2, respectively. The main distinguishing feature of these two distributions is that there is 
evidence of some deterioration in the ability of subjects to make correct forecasts under 
treatment 2 as compared to their ability in treatment 1. In other words, increasing the threshold 
appears to have adversely affected the ability of participants to correctly forecast whether or not 
resistance will be successful. 
Odds and ends 
 We are interested to know whether the main behavioral patterns observed in public goods 
games also are observed in the resistance game that is the focus of this study. Two features of 
multi-period public goods games are particularly noteworthly in the current context.9 
Specifically, there is considerably more giving in public goods games than predicted in the hard-
nosed Nash equilibrium, and cooperation in multi-period public goods games appears to 
deteriorate in later rounds of a session. We also find substantial evidence of “out-of-equilibrium’ 
                                                 
9 See Ledyard (1996) for a detailed review of this literature. 
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play in our resistance game. DMs demand substantially more than predicted by the theory, and 
Others are more successful in resisting ‘outsized’ transfer demands than predicted by the theory.  
We also examine whether there is a decline in cooperation among Others in later periods 
of a session as compared to earlier periods. In the first five periods of a session, Others 
successfully resist transfer demands 54 percent of the time, compared to 41 percent of the time in 
the last 5 rounds of a session. This observations suggests that, as in a multi-period public goods 
game, there is some deterioration in the ability of Others to cooperate to resist transfer demands. 
For treatment 1, the corresponding figures are 64 percent and 48 percent, and for treatment 2, the 
figures are 37 percent and 30 percent. There is a decline in the ability of Others to resist coercion 
in later rounds of the game, compared to their ability in earlier rounds. Nevertheless, the ability 
to resist remains rather high even in the later rounds. Second, the ability to cooperate in resisting 
transfer demands is much greater when the threshold is smaller than when it is greater. 
Curiously, the decline in the ability to cooperate between the first five periods and the last five 
periods of a session is steeper in treatment 1 (-26 percent) compared to treatment 2 (-18 percent). 
 
CONCLUSION 
We adapt a public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to 
resist coercive government actions in the face of individual incentives to do otherwise. For this 
purpose, we use a resistance game which is a form of threshold public goods game. The 
equilibrium strategy in this game is for a DM to make a modest transfer demand of 3 (7) francs 
in treatment 1 (2) and for Others to offer no resistance to such demands. In the case of “out of 
equilibirum” transfer demands, the theory suggests that Others will not resist them. We find that 
the observed average earnings of DMs are substantially greater than that predicted by the 
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efficient, subgame perfect equilibrium of our game. Furthermore, subjects’ forecasts of the RFB 
are remarkably accurate. We also find that the probability of resistance is smaller in later periods 
of a session than in earlier ones. Nevertheless, the probability of resisting transfer demands is 
rather high relative to that predicted by the theory, even in the later periods of a session. Finally, 
we find that the probability of cooperating to resist coercion decreases as the obstacles to 
cooperation increase, as evidenced by the decline in the probability of resistance when the 
threshold is increased from 13 to 29 francs. 
Regarding the topic of this conference, we find that laboratory subjects, despite the 
predictions of the theory, are indeed able to cooperate in resisting coercion despite the social 
dilemma inherent in this game. In a related study provided for this conference, Cettolin and Riedl 
(2011) investigate the incidence of the free-rider problem when one member of a group is 
singled out to make a mandatory minimum contribution to the group fund of a public goods 
game. In standard public goods games, some people appear to cooperate when they perceive 
others doing so and refuse to cooperate when they perceive others failing to do so. Such behavior 
is referred to in the literature as cooditional cooperation. Cettolin and Riedl are interested to 
know whether coodinational cooperators will make voluntary contributions to the public good 
when a member of the group is coerced to make a contribution to the public good. They find that 
coerced cooperation does not significantly affect voluntary contributions to the public good by 
the non-coerced members of the group. Thus, interestingly, coerced “cooperation” does not 
appear to mitigate the coordination problem that underlies the free-rider problem. In other words, 
reciprocal cooperation by conditional cooperators appears to require others in the group to take 
voluntary actions. 
We believe that our findings make an important contribution to the public finance 
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literature, not only from an academic perspective but also from a policy perspective. Our 
findings are consistent with anecdotal evidence that people find it very difficult to cooperate in 
resisting unpopular legislation in democratic states and even more so in the case of authoritarian 
and despotic regimes. In fact, our finding that increasing the resistance threshold makes 
successful resistance more difficult to achieve suggests that the more despotic the regime the less 
likely it will be that people can successfully cooperate to resist it. In effect, a despotic regime 
increases the resistance threshold to government action allowing it to take extraordinarily 
coercive actions against the populous. History is repleat with examples of despotic regimes, even 
ones engaged in the mass extermenation of the population, which apparently could only be 
resisted, if at all, through foreign intervention to overthrow the regime. Examples of such 
regimes include Hitler’s Germany and Pol Pot’s Cambodia.  
Our findings suggest future research. Our DM is a randomly assigned dictator who may 
impose a reallocation of initial endowments, though Others have the option of avoiding 
redistribution by contributing to a resistance fund. Future research could investigate how 
appointment of the DM, including democratic election, impact behavior in this game. In 
addition, coordination mechanisms such as cheap talk or a credible pre-commitment device may 
have a profound impact on the ability to resist unfavorable policies. 
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APPENDIX 
 
General Instructions 
 
You have been asked to participate in a decision-making experiment.  It is very important 
that you not talk or communicate with others throughout the experiment.  The instructions which 
we have distributed to you are solely for your private information.  If you have any questions, 
please ask a monitor. 
 
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in francs.  At the end of the 
experiment the total amount of francs you have earned will be converted to dollars at the 
following rate: 
 
5 francs = 1 dollar   
 
At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment and the $2 bonus if you 
arrived on time will be paid to you immediately in cash.  You will also be asked to complete a 
pre-experiment questionnaire before making any decisions as well as a post-experiment 
questionnaire and for doing so, you will receive $4. 
 
The experiment is divided into different periods.  In all, the experiment consists of 10 
periods.  In each period the participants are divided into groups of five.  You will therefore be in 
a group with 4 other participants.  Your group will consist of the same five participants 
throughout the experiment. 
 
The remainder of the instructions explains exactly how the experiment is conducted.    
Remember that we ask that you avoid talking, signaling, or making noises to other participants at 
any time. 
 
Specific Instructions 
 
In the experiment today all members of your group will be endowed with 25 francs.  One 
group member is referred to as the “Decision-Maker or DM” and the remaining four group 
members as “Others.”  At this time no one knows who the DM is for your group (even the 
experimenters).  It could be that you will be the DM, as we will soon describe.   
 
At the beginning of a period the DM for your group will propose how many francs each of 
the Others will transfer to him/her.  The proposed transfer is the same for all 4 group members.  
If you are an Other, after you are informed of the proposed transfer to the DM you must decide 
whether you will voluntarily transfer the francs to the DM or resist the transfer.  If you do not 
want to pay the transfer asked by the DM you can pay any number of francs into a Fund for your 
group.  Each period the experimenter will add together the contributions to the Fund made by 
members of your group.  If in a period the Fund has 13 or more francs, the transfer to the DM is 
not paid.  But, if the Fund has less than 13 francs, you lose your contribution to the Fund and 
also must pay the transfer to the DM.   
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Here are the two alternatives: 
 
1. The Fund has a total of 13 or more francs.  None of the Others has to transfer francs to 
the DM and the DM receives nothing for the period.  The Others keep all francs they 
did not pay into the Fund.  This alternative is summarized as follows, where c = an 
Other’s contribution to the Fund: 
 
   When Fund  13, Other’s Earnings = 25 – c and DM Earnings = 25. 
 
Note: The contribution to the fund by each Other is their own private decision and can be 
the same or different from the contributions of other group members.  Thus, each Other 
group member potentially has a different contribution (c) and different earnings. 
 
2. The Fund has a total of less than of 13 francs.  The francs paid into the Fund are lost 
and all Others must pay the transfer proposed by the DM.  If an Other does not have 
sufficient funds remaining to fulfill the DM’s proposal, the member transfers all 
remaining francs to the DM.   The DM receives the transfer proposed (or somewhat 
less if a group member has insufficient funds).  This alternative is summarized as 
follows, where c = an Other’s contribution to the Fund and T = transfer proposed by 
DM: 
 
   When Fund < 13, Others Earnings = 25 - T – c and DM Earnings = 4*T + 25 
 
 In addition to the earnings decisions above, each period all group members will receive 1 
franc per period to forecast the total contribution to the Fund by their group members. 
 
The experimenter has randomly determined both group membership and which 
member of the group will be the DM.  After the instructions are complete the experimenter 
will distribute decision forms to each participant here today.  If your decision form is for the 
Decision-Maker you are the randomly selected DM for your group.  Otherwise, your form 
will indicate you are an Other. Please do not reveal your role to other participants at any 
time.  Also, recall that the experiment includes 10 periods. 
 
Decisions 
 
 Please refer to the Practice Decision Forms included with these instructions. 
 
 Each period will proceed as follows:  
 
1. Each DM will record their proposed transfer (T) in column (3) from each of the Other 
four group members and make a forecast of the Total Fund balance in column (5) of the 
DM’s Decision Form.  All participants’ folders will then be collected.   
 
2. The experimenter will record the proposed transfer (T) in column (3) of the Others 
Decision Forms and return folders to all participants.   
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3. The Other Group Members will then record their contributions to the Fund in column (4) 
of their Decision Forms and also record in column (5) of their decision form the total 
group contribution expected this period to the Fund.  Again the experimenter will collect 
all folders.   
 
4. The total Fund balance for each group will be computed and recorded in column (6) of 
the Others’ Record Sheets and column (6) of the DM’s.  The experimenter will return the 
folders and all participants will compute their period earnings in the final column. 
 
 After a period concludes, we move to the next period with the DM recording their proposed 
transfer (T) from each group member and repeat all steps above. 
 
 Do you have any questions?  
 
 Before we begin the experiment we will complete the practice exercises below, as well as a 
short pre-experiment questionnaire. Then the experimenter will distribute a folder to each 
participant in the room.  Again, if you are the randomly selected DM for your group, the 
Decision Form will so indicate.  Otherwise, the form will indicate that you are an Other.  Your 
role today will not be revealed to anyone in the room.  Recall that group membership and the 
DM were randomly determined by the experimenter. 
 
Practice Exercises 
 
Now we will complete the practice exercises.  You will complete them for an Other as well as 
for a DM. 
 
1. In the first period the DM proposes a transfer of 20 francs.  One Other offers resistance (c) of 
4 francs.  The Fund balance is 11 francs.  Compute each Practice Decision Form. 
 
2.  In the second period the DM proposes a transfer of 2 francs.  One Other offers resistance (c) 
of 10 francs. The Fund balance is 36 francs.  Compute each Practice Decision Form. 
 
 
We will now distribute the folders and give the DMs 5 minutes to determine their proposed 
transfers for period 1. 
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Participant Number _____________ 
 
 
DECISION FORM 
Others 
 
(1) 
Period 
(2) 
Beginning 
balance 
Francs 
(3) 
Transfer 
proposed by 
your DM 
(T) 
(4) 
Your 
contribution to 
the Fund 
(c) 
(5) 
Your “Forecast” 
of 
Total Fund 
balance 
 
(6) 
Actual  
Total Fund 
balance 
(7) 
Earnings* 
1 25      
2 25      
3 25      
4 25      
5 25      
6 25      
7 25      
8 25      
9 25      
10 25      
Total earnings in dollars [sum of column (7) divided by 5]   
Forecast earnings in dollars [1 franc for each forecast in column (5) divided by 5]   
Add $2 bonus if on time   
Add $4 for completion of the pre and post-experiment questionnaires   
 
   * Earnings each period are determined as follows: 
   When  Fund  13,  Your Earnings = 25 - c 
    Fund < 13,  Your Earnings = 25 - T – c 
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Participant Number _____________ 
 
DECISION FORM 
Decision-maker (DM) 
 
(1) 
Period 
(2) 
Beginning 
balance 
(3) 
Record the 
proposed 
transfer from 
each of the 
Others 
(T from 0 to 
25) 
(4) 
4*T 
(5) 
Your 
“Forecast” 
of 
Total Fund 
balance 
 
(6) 
Total 
Fund 
balance 
 
(7) 
Earnings** 
1 25      
2 25      
3 25      
4 25      
5 25      
6 25      
7 25      
8 25      
9 25      
10 25      
Total earnings in dollars [sum of column (7) divided by 5]  
Forecast earnings in dollars [1 franc for each forecast in column (5) divided by 5]  
Add $2 bonus if on time  
Add $4 for completion of the pre and post-experiment questionnaires  
 
    ** Earnings each period are determined as follows: 
    When  Fund  13,  Your Earnings = 25 
    Fund < 13,  Your Earnings = 4*T + 25 
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Practice DECISION FORM: Others 
(1) 
Period 
(2) 
Beginning 
balance 
(3) 
Transfer 
proposed by 
your DM 
(T) 
(4) 
Your 
contribution to 
the Fund 
(c) 
(5) 
Your “forecast” 
of  
Total Fund 
balance 
 
(6) 
Actual  
Total 
Fund 
balance 
 
(7) 
Earnings* 
1 25      
2 25      
Total earnings in dollars [sum of column (7) divided by 5]   
Forecast earnings in dollars [1 franc for each forecast in column (5) divided by 5]   
Add $2 bonus if on time   
Add $4 for completion of the pre and post-experiment questionnaires   
* Earnings each period are determined as follows: 
    When  Fund  13,  Your Earnings = 25 - c 
     Fund < 13,  Your Earnings = 25 - T – c 
Practice DECISION FORM: Decision-maker (DM)  
(1) 
Period 
(2) 
Beginning 
balance 
(3) 
Record the 
proposed 
transfer from 
each of the 
Others 
(T from 0 to 
25) 
(4) 
4*T 
(5) 
Your 
“Forecast” 
of 
Total Fund 
balance 
 
(6) 
Total 
Fund 
balance 
 
(7) 
Earnings** 
1 25      
2 25      
Total earnings in dollars [sum of column (7) divided by 5]  
Forecast earnings in dollars [1 franc for each forecast in column (5) divided by 5]  
Add $2 bonus if on time  
Add $4 for completion of the pre and post-experiment questionnaires  
** Earnings each period are determined as follows: 
    When  Fund  13,  Your Earnings = 25 
    Fund < 13,  Your Earnings = 4*T + 25 
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Pre-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to collect information to help the researchers understand decisions made 
throughout the experiment.  Please be assured that you cannot be personally identified from your responses.  
You will be paid to complete the questionnaire, so please be sure to fill it out completely.   
 
List five words that best describe who you are: 
 
 
 
1. _____________________ 
 
 
 
2. _____________________ 
 
 
 
3. _____________________ 
 
 
 
4. _____________________ 
 
 
 
5. _____________________ 
 
 
 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to collect information to help the researchers understand decisions made 
throughout the experiment.  Please be assured that you cannot be personally identified from your responses.  
You will be paid to complete the questionnaire, so please be sure to fill it out completely.  Please double check 
to ensure that you have not inadvertently skipped a question when you are finished and answer all questions 
as fully as possible. 
 
1. What is your standing in your university? (check one) 
_____ undergraduate student  _____ masters student  _____ Ph.D. student _____ Other 
 
2. Based on your current standing (i.e., undergrad, masters, Ph.D.), what is your year of study (e.g., 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th)? 
_________   
 
3. What is your college (e.g., management, education?) _________  
 
4. What is your major area of concentration (e.g., accounting, biology)? ___________ 
 
5. What is your sex? (check one)  male ____   female ____ 
 
6. What is your age? ____ years 
 
 25 
 
7. What is your race/ethnicity? (check one)   
 
Black (not if Hispanic origin) _____   White (not of Hispanic origin) ______   Hispanic _____   
Asian or Pacific Islander _____   American Indian or Alaska Native _____     
Other (please detail) _________________________   
 
8. How would you characterize your current economic situation? (circle number) 
               
Poor  1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Wealthy 
 
9. How interesting did you find this experiment?  
 
Not Very             Very 
Interesting 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Interesting 
 
10. How would you characterize the amount of money earned in this experiment for the time required?  
 
Nominal             Considerable 
Amount 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Amount 
 
11. In general, how would you characterize your political attitudes?  
 
Very              Very 
Liberal 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Conservative 
 
12. In general, how would you characterize your religious beliefs?  
 
Not Religious       Very 
At All 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Religious 
 
13. How would you characterize your behavior today?  
 
Very        Very 
Selfish 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Generous 
 
14. How would you characterize the decisions of your group?  
 
Very        Very 
Selfish 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Generous 
 
15. How would you characterize people, in general?  
 
Very        Very 
Selfish 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 Generous 
 
16. Are you married? (check one)  yes ____   no ____ 
 
If not, are you in a committed relationship? (check one)  yes ____   no ____ 
 
17. How many children do you have? ____  
 
18. What is your religious affiliation? ___________ 
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19. How important are groups for you in general? 
 
 Not at all     1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11     To a great extent 
 
20. Are you feeling happy today? 
 
 Not at all     1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11     To a great extent 
 
21. Please give a brief statement on what you think about groups in general and what your experiences (positive or 
negative) are. 
 
22. How would you characterize your Decision-maker’s (DM’s) behavior today?   
 
 Check if you were the DM:  N/A ______ 
 
Very       Very 
selfish 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 generous 
 
23. How would you characterize your Other group members’ behavior today?  
 
Very       Very 
cooperative 1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10----11 uncooperative 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables 
Others Decision-makers 
All Treatment 1 Treatment 2 All Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Transfer demand (francs) - - - - - - 9.85    6.49 8.74   6.42 11.40   6.34 
Contribution to resistance fund (francs) 4.02 3.91 3.39 3.05   4.89    4.73 - - - - - - 
Forecast of resistance fund balance (francs) 18.23 17.17 15.27 10.63   22.37    22.82 16.46   8.78 13.82   7.41 20.15    9.26 
Forecast error (francs) 1.95 17.22 1.47 10.04 2.61    23.88 0.29    10.97 0.11    7.84 0.57   14.33 
Period earnings (francs) 17.11 5.87 19.48 4.21 13.79    6.24 40.25    21.47 33.5    14.22 49.7    26.00 
Percent of transfer demands resisted 46 4.9 56     4.9 33     4.7   - - - - - - 
Age 24 6.2 22      43   25    7.9 24     7.29 21  2.69 27     10.02 
Age-squared 594 372 511     246 710    474   616    443 465   130 827    612 
Number of years of university education 0.03 0.17 1.02    0.15 0.04    0.20 - - 1        - - - 
Percent black 23 4.2 27    4.5    17    3.7   - - - - - - 
Percent white 48 5.0 47     4.9   50     5.0  79     4.1 88    3.3 67    4.8  
Percent hispanic 3 1.8 2.3      1.7 4     2.0 - - - - - - 
Percent asian 21 4.0 17     3.8 25     4.3    14  3.5 12  3.3 17      3.8 
Percent other races 5 2.2 5     2.3 4     2.0 7     2.6 0        0 17      3.8 
Percent Christian 50 5.0 59    4.9 36     4.8   39    4.9 21   4.1   75      4.4  
Percent Catholic 9 2.9 29     2.4    14    3.4 15   3.5 21  4.1 - - 
Percent with no declared religion 28 4.5 29    4.6 27     4.5     31     4.6 45     5.0 - - 
Percent other religions 12 3.3 54    2.3    23     4.2    16    3.7 12  3.3 25      4.4 
Percent married 11 3.2 93     2.5   18    3.9 16  3.7 - - 50     5.1 
Percent female  54 4.9 47     4.9 63     4.9    75 4.3 69 4.7 83     3.8 
Number of observations 575 335 240 144 84 60 
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TABLE 2: Random effects model of the Decision-maker’s transfer demands 
Variable Estimated coefficient 
Constant 78.00** (34.15) 
Lagged transfer demand 0.249** (0.103) 
DM’s forecast of resistance fund balance 0.0437 (0.079) 
Lagged forecast error 0.095 (0.058) 
Resistance in previous period 
(= 1 if resistance was successful in previous period) 
-1.166 
(1.329) 
Threshold indicator variable (= 1 if 29 francs) -0.621 (1.672) 
Gender (= 1 if female) -1.514 (1.612) 
Martial status (= 1 if married) -2.086 (14.06) 
Age -4.724* (2.606) 
Age-squared 0.0805 (0.052) 
Race (= 1 if white) -7.560*** (2.340) 
R2 0.340 
Number of observations 123 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustering by 13 Decision-makers; 
2 DMs are dropped because they did not report their marital status. Asterisks indicate the 
stastical significance of the estimated coefficient, as follows: *** indicates a p-value < 
0.01; ** indicates a p-value < 0.05; and * indicates a p-value < 0.1. 
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TABLE 3: Random effects OLS and 2SLS models of Other contributions 
Variables OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Constant -9.619 (7.611) 
-6.468 
(4.312) 
-2.453 
(1.891) 
Transfer demand 0.219*** (0.0242) 
-0.102 
(0.147) 
-0.0934 
(0.146) 
Threshold (= 1 if 29 francs) 1.075 (0.734) 
2.548*** 
(0.743) 
2.426*** 
(0.774) 
Correct forecast of resistance - 0.351** (0.171) 
0.340* 
(0.177) 
Age 0.615 (0.559) 
0.413 
(0.317) 
0.0611 
(0.0553) 
Age-squared -0.00895 (0.00980) 
-0.00627 
(0.00553) - 
Gender (= 1 if female) 0.383 (0.712) 
-0.478 
(0.590) 
-0.341 
(0.473) 
Marital status (= 1 if single) 2.251 (1.747) 
1.653 
(1.047) 
2.203** 
(0.996) 
Number of years in college -0.521 (1.808) 
-0.0687 
(1.105) 
-0.0777 
(1.107) 
African-American -1.055 (1.529) 
0.301 
(0.929) - 
White -0.734 (1.433) 
-0.325 
(0.823) - 
Hispanic -2.372 (2.624) 
0.115 
(1.588) - 
Asian and Pacific Islander -1.507 (1.547) 
0.143 
(1.083) - 
Protestant 0.995 (0.832) - - 
Catholic 0.877 (1.520) - - 
Other religion 1.299 (1.212) - - 
Number of observations 555 549 549 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustering by the 58 Others; 2 Others are 
dropped because they did not report their marital status. Asterisks indicate the stastical 
significance of the estimated coefficient, as follows: *** indicates a p-value < 0.01; ** 
indicates a p-value < 0.05; and * indicates a p-value < 0.1. 
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FIGURE 1: Frequency distribution of DM’s transfer demand and of successful resistance 
(all subjects) 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the frequency distribution of transfer demands and, conditional on the 
DM’s transfer demand, the frequency distribution of resistance for all subjects. 
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FIGURE 2: Frequency distribution of DM’s transfer demand and of successful resistance  
(treatment 1 subjects) 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the frequency distribution of transfer demands and, conditional on the 
DM’s transfer demand, the frequency distribution of resistance for the sample of subjects 
participating in treatment 1. 
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FIGURE 3: Frequency distribution of DM’s transfer demand and of successful resistance  
(subjects in treatment 2) 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the frequency distribution of transfer demands and, conditional 
on theDM’s transfer demand, the frequency distribution of resistance for the saample of 
subjects participating in treatment 2. 
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FIGURE 4: Distribution of forecast accuracy (all subjects) 
 
 
 35 
 
FIGURE 5: Distribution of forecast accuracy (treatment 1) 
 
FIGURE 6: Distribution of forecast accuracy (treatment 2) 
 
